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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a single reduced—form inflation equation that can
explain both the variance and acceleration of inflation during the 1970s.
Inflation is explained by four sets of factors. Aggregate demand enters
through the lagged output ratio and the growth rate of nominal GNP.
The adjustment of inflation to changes in aggregate demand is limited by
the role of inertia in the inflation process, expressed as the dependence
of the rate of change of prices on its own past values. Two types of
supply—side elements enter. Government intervention directly altered the
price level during the Nixon control era, and in addition the government
has aggrevated the inflation problem by what have been called "self—
inflicted wounds," including increases in the effective social security tax
rate and effective minimum wage. Also there have been external supply
shocks that are outside of the immediate control of the government,
including changes in the relative prices of food and energy, changes in the
growth rate of productivity, and changes in the foreign exchange value of
the dollar.
Considerable attention is given to alternative methods of estimating
the impact of direct episodes of government intervention In the price—setting
process, particularly during the Nixon controls. We find that such episodes
have been futile. Because of their futility, these intervention episodes
can be regarded as "self—inflicted wounds," like 'the payroll tax and






(312) 492—3616While the inflation experience of the U. S. between the end. of the Korean
war and the end of the decade of the l960s can be explained adequatelyby a
conventional Phillips curve approach, the high variance and continued accel-
eration of inflation during the decade of the 1970spose new challenges to
the time—series econometrician. Why did inflation continueto speed up from
about 5 percent in early 1971 to 10percent in early 1980, despite an average
ratio of actual real GNP to "natural" real GNP (hereafter the"output ratio")
that was below its average level of the 1950s and 1960s? Andwhy was infla-
tion so variable, falling from an annual rate of 5.3percent in the first
half of 1971 to 3.0 percent in the middle twoquarters of 1972, then rising
to 11.7 percent In the last half of 1974, thenfalling to 4.2 percent in the
first half of 1976, and finally rising to 10.1percent in the first quarter
of 1980?1
This paper presents a single reduced—form inflationequation that can
explain both the variance and acceleration of inflationduring the r970. It
can be regarded as a sequel to an earlier paper that fit a similar inflation
equation to a long period of historical annual data for theperiod l892_l978.2
It applies the same basic specification to quarterly data for the1954—80
period and devotes more attention to supply—side variables that haveparticular
relevance for the recent behavior of inflation. Inflation isexplaind by
four sets of factors. Aggregate demandenters through the same variables
as in the earlier study, the lagged output ratio and the growth rate of
nominal GNP. The adjustment of inflation to changes inaggregate demand is
limited by the role of inertia in the inflationprocess, expressed as the
dependence of the rate of change of prices on its own past values. Twotypes
of supply—side elements enter. Government interventiondirectly altered the2
price level during the Nixon control era, and in addition the government has
aggravated the inflation problem by what have been called "self inflicted
wounds", including increases in the effective social security tax rate and
effective minimum wage. Also there have been external supply shocks
that are outside of the immediate control of the government, including changes
in the relative prices of food and energy, changes in the growth rate of pro-
ductivity, and changes in the foreign exchange value of the dollar.
Thus the main themes of the paper are that inflation cannot be explained
simply as the result of excessive demand stimulation, or of a single type of
supply shock, or of inertia by itself. Considerable attention is given
to alternative methods of estimating the impact of direct episodes of government
intervention in the price—setting process, particularly during the Nixon controls.
We find that such episodes 1ave been futile. The Nixon—era controls temporarily
held down the price level and then allowed it to bounce back to its "no—controls"
level, thus contributing to the instability of both inflation and real output.
Other episodes of intervention——the Kennedy—Johnson guidelines and Carter pay
standards——had no effect at all on the inflation process.
Because of their futility, these intervention episodes can be regarded as
"self—inflicted wounds", like the payroll tax and minimum wage changes that
normally are described by this term of opprobrium. Although space limitations
prevent us from assessing the full range of policy alternatives that face
Washington policymakers, it seems clear that there are enough degrees of freedom
in the inflation process to allow creative policies to heal the wounds and to
offset the unavoidable impact of external supply shocks.3
I BASIC SPECIFICATION OF TUE REDUCED—FORM INFLATION EQUATION
We begin from a pair of wage and price equations and combine them to
obtain our basic reduced—form equation that is used for estimation below.
The rate of wage change depends on the sum of lagged price change and the
desired rate of real wage growth, on the level and rate of change of the
output ratio, and on supply shifts that affect the wage—setting process.
The rate of price change relative to the current rate of wage change depends
on the change in "standard" productivity, the level and rate of change of
theoutputratio, and on supply shifts that affect the price—setting process.






where upper—case letters designate logs of levels of variables and lower—case
letters designate their proportional rates of change. Equation (1) states that
the inflation rate depends on past inflation the difference between
the desired rate of real wage growth in the wage equation (Xe) and the rate of
"standard" productivity growth relevant for price—setting decisions the
level of the output ratio the rate of change of the output ratio
and a vector of supply shift variables and an error term (iE).3
What are the conditions necessary for (1) to generate a constant equili—
brium rate of inflation? First, the coefficient on lagged price change
must be unity. Second, the real wage term in the wage equation and standard
productivity growth in the price equation must be equal (X_a 0). Third,4
the level and rate of change of theoutput ratio, as well as every supply
shift variable, must also be equal to zero == Z=0).Correspon-
dingly, (1) lays out those events that can cause the inflation rateto
accelerate, including an excess of over a1, a level of the log of the
output ratio above zero, a positive rate of growth of the output ratio,
and any adverse supply shock. Clearly =0(i.e., =Q),represents
the "natural rate of output" only If all of the otherconditions stated In
the previous sentence are valid. If there is, forinstance, an adverse
supply shift (z >0), inflation can accelerate even if 0. In other
words, an excess of over or a positive realization of anyz variable.
pushes the "constant Inflation" level of output below the value of from
which is calculated. Thus the framework of equation (1) has thepotential
of explaining why inflation accelerated during thel970s, despite the fact
that our measure of was negative on average during the decade.
There is one rather subtle obstacle to the estimation of(1). We would
expect the rate of inflation to respond positively to the speed of economic
expansion, cl. But there are two reasons whyPt and may have a negative
correlation that results in a downward bias in the coefficienty2. One
reason is measurement error; since nominal GNP and prices are measured
independently, with real GNP as a residual, any error in the measurement of
prices introduces an opposite movement in Second,for any given growth
rate of nominal GNP, a supply shock(z > 0) raises p and reducesq; any
errors in measurement of thez variables may introduce a spurious negative
correlation betweenPt and To avoid this problem we use the identity
Pt + =y,where the latter variable stands for the excess of nominal5
GNP growth over the growth in natural real GNP =— q).When this
identity is substituted for in (1), we can factor outPt and obtain our
final estimating equation:4
(2)
Pt l2t + lQ1 + + ÷ci.
(2) is the form for which we provide estimates in thispaper. We must,
of course, specify the productivity term(X —a)and the exact variables to
represent the supply shock terms (zr). We note that the long—run equilibrium
properties of (2) differ slightly from those of (1). If the sum of coeff i—
cients on lagged prices in (1) is unity =1),then in (2) it will be the
sum of the coefficients on lagged prices and ony that equal unity.
II TWO TJNICAUSAL APPROACHES
Before the details of the basic inflation equationare discussed and
results presented, we first provide estimates of twosimpler equations that
stress single—cause explanations of inflation. In recentyears considerable
attention has been given to autoregressive integratedmoving average (ARIMA)
models, and an early evaluation of the Nixon controlsprogram by Edgar Feige
and Douglas Pearce used this technique. Apure ARINA model explains inflation
entirely by its own past values. The ARIMA model thusrepresents an extreme
view that the inflation process is entirely dominatedby inertia and is
unaffected by changes in current exogenous variables.Nevertheless, an ARIMA
price change equation provides an interesting standard ofcomparison for our
more complete specification.6
Another unicausal approach is a simple monetarist equation that makes
the rate of change of prices depend only on a distributed lag of past
changes in the money supply. While this framework is taken more seriously
by journalists and laymen than academic economists, a "money only" explana-
tion of inflation is implicit in some recent tests of the classical equili-
brium approach to macroeconomics.5 Like the ARIMA technique, the money—only
approach allows for inertia in the inflation process if it allows past changes
in money to affect current inflation with a long distributed lag. We use the
ARIMA and money—only equations to provide an alternative estimate of the effect
of the Nixon price controls.6 Dummy variables are added to both equations for
two separate periods, one when the control effect was "on" between 197l:Q3 and
l972:Q4, and a second between l974:Q2 and 1975:Ql when the termination of the
controls created an "of f" effect.7 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 display the
resulting coefficients on the dummy variables and the summary regression
statistics. Both the ARIMA and money—only models fit the data for the 1954—80
period with similar standard errors of about one percentage point.The Nixon
controls dummy variables are scaled to show the cumulative impact of the
controls on the price level during the appropriate period, and thus their co-
efficients in both columns (1) and (2) indicate that the controls held down the
price level by about 3 percent at the end of 1972, while their termination
allowed the price level to bounce back to roughly its no—controls level.
An alternative method of assessing the impact of controls is to compute
a post—sample dynamic simulation of an equation estimated to the pre—controls
period and treat it as an estimate of inflation in the counter—factual state.9
Line l4a and l4b of Table 1 show the post—sample simulation errors of an equation
estimated for l954:Q2 to 197l:Q2.. The post—sample ARIMA extrapolation cannotNumbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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TABLE 1
Measuresof the Impact of Nixon—era Wage and Price Controls
Using Alternative Models of the Inflation Process



































7.Food and Energy Prices 0.29
(4.21)
8.Productivity Deviation f/ —0.38
(—5.91)
9.Effective Exchange Rate f/ —0.09
(—3.33)
10.Social Security Tax f/ 0.43
(2.19)








13.a. S.E.E. 1.15 1.05 .646
b. D.W. 2.07 1.60 2.22
14.Cumulated Errors from Dynamic
Simulation within Specified
Intervals /
a. "On" l97l:Q3—1972:Q4 —1.93 —3.46 —1.23
b. "Off" l974:Q2—l975:Q1 5.28 4.09 3.088
Notes to Table 1
a. The dependent variable is 400 times the quarterly first difference of
the log of the fixed weight GNP deflator.
b. The coefficients in column (1) are estimated in a regressionequation
in which all variables are pre—filtered as described in thetext.
c. The coefficient shown is the sum of 24 distributed lag coefficients
constrained to lie along a fourth degree polynomial with a zero end constraint.
d. The dummy variables are constrained to addup to 4.0 (reflecting the
conversion of quarterly changes of all variables to annual rates). Thus
the "on" dummy is equal to 2/3 for the sixquarters listed, and the "off"
dummy is equal to 1.0 for the four quarters listed.
e. The coefficient shown is the sum of 28 distributed lag coefficients
constrained to lie on a fifth degree polynomial with zero end constraint.
f. The coefficient shown is the sum of a set of unconstrainedco-
efficients on current and lagged values, with four lags includedon lines 8,
10 and 11, and two lags included on line 9.
g. The equation represented by each column is re—estimated for the period
l954:Q2—1971:Q2 and dynamically simulated beginning l97lQ3. In column (3)
estimation is subject to the constraint that the sum of coefficientson
adjusted nominal GNP growth and lagged inflation equals 1.9
explain why inflation in 1974 was so rapid, while the money—only equation
yields simulation errors that are roughly similar to the coefficients on
the dummy variables. This difference is to be expected, since thepost—
sample simulations of the money equations use information on the money
supply during controls but the ARIMA dynamic simulation uses no Information
beyond 197l:Q2.
IIISPECIFICATION AND RESULTS FOR THE BASIC EQUATION
The third column of Table 1 presents estimates of our basic equation
as specified in (2) above. A line by line discussion of our variables and
results follows:
1. Lagged Inflation. The inertia in the inflationprocess is captured
by a distributed lag on 24 past values of fixed weight GNP deflator inflation.
Because the explicitly temporary effects of the controlsprogram should not
enter this measure of inertia, the estimated controls effects are removed
from the lagged dependent variable, requiring iterativeestimation. This
procedure reduces the standard error of the equation and increases the esti-
mated impact of both the imposition and removal of controls. The 24 lag
coefficients are constrained to lie along a fourth degree polynomial with
a zero end constraint, and their sum, 0.94, is reported on Line 1 of Table 1.
2. and 3. Nixon Control Dummies. The Nixon controlsprogram is esti-
mated to have held down prices 1.45 percent at the end of 1972, but this
effect was more than cancelled by the rebound inflation of 1.52percent.
The estimate of each effect is about half of thecorresponding estimate in
the unicausa]. models. This is because the unicausal models must attribute
the control period effects of all omitted variables to the control dummies.10
But inflation was low in 1971:Q3—1972:Q4 in part because of the productivity
gains of this period, and inflation was high in 1974 in part because of a
productivity reversal, food and energy price shocks, and the depreciation of
the exchange rate of theU.S. dollar.
5. LaggedOutputRatio. This variable is the log of the ratio of real
output to the natural rate of output, that is = — Q1.The Q*
variable used to obtain the output ratio and, in rate of change form, to adjust
nominal GNP growth is from Jeffrey Perloff and Michael Wachter)0 This tradi-
tional Phillips curve variable is highly significant; its coefficient of 0.23
indicates that a one percentage point excess of actual real GNP above natural
real GNP causes an acceleration of inflation of 0.23 percentage points at an
annual rate per quarter. The total acceleration over the first year of such
an excess would be greater than 0.23 percentage points, because after the first
quarter the additional inflation would begin to feed through the lagged dependent
variable.
6. Adjusted Nominal GNP Growth. Just as the demand level variable
is defined such that a value of zero makes no contribution to inflation, the
nominal GNP growth variable is defined net of natural real GNP growth. A slowdown
in the trend growth rate of productivity will reduce natural real GNP growth and
raise y, so that this variable represents the combined effects of demand stimu-
lation and trend productivity growth.
7. Relative Prices of Food and Energj. The first of the supply shock
variables to be introduced in Table 1 is the contribution to inflation of
changes in the relative prices of food and energy. This effect is measured by
the difference between the rate of change of the private business deflator and
that of an alternative deflator that attempts to "strip out" the impact of the11
changing relative prices of food and energy.11 While this variable makes
a significant contribution to the fit of the equation, its coefficient is
surprisingly low. This probably reflects errors in the measurement of
the food—energy contribution due to differences in coverage and weighting
from the dependent variable.
8. Productivity Deiation. Suppose desired real wage growth, X,
is 2 percent per year but mean productivity gains are fixed at 1 percent.
Then equation (2) states that this will add one percentage point to the
rate of inflation. Similarly, any difference between and is a source
of a constant term in a regression fit to (2))2 If the rate of productivity
growth varies, it is reasonable to assume that an average of actual and mean
productivity is used in pricing decisions, that is, some fraction of the
deviation of productivity from its mean. To capture the recent decline in
mean productivity, the productivity deviation variable is the residual series
from a regression of the rate of growth nonf arm productivity on a constant
and a time trend beginning in 1970.
9. Effective Exchange Rate. The depreciation of the dollar during the
1970s has not been included as an explanatory variable in previous studies,
mainly because it has been difficult to find a statistically significant effect
for changes in the exchange rate. We believe that this previous insignificance
of the exchange rate stems from the impact of the Nixon controls in delaying
the adjustment of U.S. domestic prices to the dollar depreciation that occurred
in two stages between 1971 and 1973. We have created a new variable which is
equal to the actual change in the effective exchange rate of the dollar (i.e.,
the number of units of a market basket of foreign currencies that the dollar
can buy each quarter) starting in 1974:Q3, but which is set equal to zero12
before 1974 and thus forces the entire 16 percent decline in the effective
exchange rate that occurred between l971:Q3 and 1974:Q2 to occur in two
quarters, 1974:Ql and 1974:Q2.
10. Social Security Tac. The coefficient of 0.43 indicates nearly
half of all changes in the effective tax rate,'3 which includes both employer
and employee shares, is shifted forward into prices.
11. Effective Minimun Wage Rate. This variable is defined as the ratio of
the statutory minimum wage to average hourly earnings in the nonfarm private
economy. Its coefficient of 0.02 means that the cumulative 8 percent increase in
the effective minimum wage rate during the four quarters in 1978 accounted for
an acceleration of inflation of about 0.16 percentage points.
The comprehensive reduced—form inflation equation of column (3) hasa
standard error of 0.65, little more than half that of unicausal models. The
more complete model substantially improves our ability to explain the 1954—80
inflation experience.
An alternative assessment of the effect of controls is provided by the
dynamic simulation beginning 1971:Q3 of our basic equation fit to data through
14
197l:Q2. The on effect estimated by dynamic simulation and reported on
line 14a approximates the dummy variable estimate, but the estimated "off"
effect is much higher because the pre—1971:Q3 equation does not contain the
effective foreign exchange rate. The post—sample simulation incorrectly
attributes the inflationary impact of the depreciation of the dollar to the
removal of the controls program. To correct for this, we haverun twojn—•sample
dynamic simulations of the 1954—80 equation, one of which sets the change in13
the effective exchange rate to zero. The difference between the two siinu—
lations yields the estimate that 1.50 percentage points of the high inflation
of the "off" period was contributed by the foreign exchange variable. A more
credible estimate of the impact of the termination of controls is therefore
3.08 —1.50=1.58,which approximates the dummy variable estimate of 1.52.
IVSENSITIVITY ANDEXTENSIONSOF THE BASIC EQUATION
Another episode of government intervention occurred during the Kennedy
and Johnson administration, when there were quasi—voluntary guidelines
established for wage increases. These guidelines, first mentioned in the
1962 Economic Report of the President, are generally assumed to have been in
effect between early 1963 and mid—1966. Our guidelines variable is assumed
to be in effect between l963:Ql —1965:Q4.We enter a separate dummy variable
for the three—year period beginning in l966:Ql to assess the possibility that
part of the 1966—68 acceleration in the inflation rate was due to the end of
the guidelines rather than a general state of excess demand in the economy.
When these dummy variables are included in our basic equation, the resulting
coefficients and t statistics are:
Guidelines dummy I(l963:Ql—1965:Q4) 0.01 (0.01)
Guidelines dummy II (1966:Ql—l968:Q4) 0.60 (0.61)
The verdict of these coefficients is that the guidelines program had no
significant effect on inflation. The positive influence on inflation of demand
growth in the 1963—65 period was offset not by the guidelines program, but by
rapid productivity growth. An important implication of this result is that if
the guidelines had a significant effect in holding down wage increases, as14
found by George Perry and others, then the program created a boom in the profit
share.
The Carter pay standards may be similarly assessed. We introduced two
dummy variables for the periods l978:Q4—l979:Q4 and 1980:Q1—1980:Q2, respectively.
The first dummy can be interpreted as the effect on inflation of the initial
year of the pay standards, while the second dummy can be interpreted either as
the effect of the second phase of the pay standards or of the "post—controls
rebound" following the first stage. The resulting coefficients and t statistics
are:
Carter dummy I (1978:Q4—l979:Q4) —0.67 (—1.08)
Carter dummy II (1980:Ql—l980:Q2) 0.05 (0.18)
Both variables are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that there was
nothing unusual about the inflation experience between late 1978 and mid 1980,
and that the other variables In the equation are capable of tracking the data.
An alternative method of assessing the Nixon controls introduced by Alan
Blinder and William Newton estimates an equation which does not use dummy
variables. Rather, a new variable represents the "on" effect that is equal
to the fraction of the CEl subject to price controls in each month, based on
government records.
The Blinder—Newton approach has two advantages over the dummy variable
technique. First, the "off" effect is captured by the change in the "on"
variable defined only in those periods when the controlled fraction decreased.
There is no need to make arbitrary decisions regarding the dating of dummy
variables, since the constructed variable contains its own information. Second,
the controls are allowed to have varying effects each quarter rather than the
uniform effect imposed by our "on" and "of f" dummies.15
We substituted the Blinder—Newton "on" variable and current and four
lagged values of the "off" variable for our control dummies, and, following
Blinder and Newton, assessed the controls effects by two dynamic simulations,
one of which had the controls variables set to zero)5 The implied controls
effect (column (a)) may be compared to our own from Table 1 (column (b)).
(a) (b)
Standard Error 0.649 0.646
Maximum Restraint —1.48% —1.45%
of Inflation
Post—Controls Rebound +1.35% +1.52%
The Blinder technique——despite the extra research required for construction
of the new variable and its lack of applicability to other episodes of govern—
ment intervention——provides neither a better fit nor an evaluation of the
Nixon controls that differs from our simple dummy variable approach.
V Conclusions
An adequate explanation of inflation in the l970s requires a model that
Includes effects of aggregate demand, government intervention, external supply
shocks, and inertia In the adjustment of prices. Our basic reduced—form
inflation equation relies on the contribution of two variables for Itsaggre—
gate demand effect, the lagged level of the output ratio and the change in
nominal GNP adjusted for changes in natural real GNP. Three forms of govern-
ment intervention influence inflation, the Nixon—era controls, changes In the
effective social security tax rate and effective minimum wage. External supply
shocks Include changes in the relative prices of food and energy, the influence
of changes in the effective exchange rate of the dollar, and deviations of16
productivity from trend. Finally, inertia is represented by the influence of
lagged inflation on the current inflation rate.
The central focus of this paper has been on the interaction of the
estimated impact of the Nixon—era controls and the other variables. Previous
studies have estimated substantial effects of the controls in holding down
inflation in 1972 and causing inflation to accelerate in 1974, and inmany
cases have found that implied impact of the removal of controls in raising
inflation in 1974 was greater than the initial impact of the controls in
holding down inflation in 1972. Several of the variables that play an impor-
tant role in our basic equation, especially the productivity deviation and
exchange rate, help to explain the actual inflation performance of 1972 and
1974 and thus assign a smaller role to the Nixon controls. In thissense
part of the impact of the Nixon controls in some previous studies confound
the actual influence of the controls and the influence of left—out variables.
In particular, we conclude that ARIMA and money—only models are inadequate for
this kind of research because they omit many variables that playan important
role in the inflation process, and therefore they yield biased estimates of
intervention effects.
Three different methods are used to assess the impact of the Nixon—era
controls within the context of our basic reduced—form inflation equation.
Post—sample dynamic simulations tend to underpredict inflation in 1974 more
than they overpredict inflation in 1972, partly because there wasno role of
the effective exchange rate before 1971. The inclusion of dummy variables
for the imposition and removal of the controls has the advantage ofusing all
of the information available in the full sample period. Dummy variables
indicate that the Nixon controls held down the price level by about 1.3percent17
between mid—1971 and late 1972, and then allowed a rebound of about 1.4percent
to occur in 1974 and early 1975. A third technique, introduced by AlanBlinder,
replaces the dummy variables with a variable that measures the fraction of prices
that were actually controlled each quarter. Although this variable seemsconcep-
tually superior, it does not alter the conclusions of the dummy variable technique,
yielding almost exactly the same standard error of estimate and the same estimated
magnitude of the impact of the controls on the price level.
Why was inflation so variable between 1971 and 1980? And why did inflation
accelerate from 5 percent in early 1971 to 10 percent in early 1980? Our basic
equation explains the high variance of inflation mainly as a result of swings in
the effect of Nixon controls, the deviation of productivity from trend, the
relative prices of food and energy, and the effective exchangerate, with an
additional minor contribution made by the aggregate demand variables and by
social security tax changes. The overall acceleration of inflationduring the
past decade is explained by the adverse contribution of most of the variables.
While the inflation equation developed in this paper identifies the main
factors that explain the recent behavior of inflation in the United States,
additional research is required before this framework can be used to assess
the consequences of alternative aggregate demand policies. Although for the
purpose of policy evaluation nominal GNP growth can be treated as exogenous,
andthe value of the lagged output ratio can be calculated from the behavior
of nominal GNP and the inflation rate thatthe equationpredicts, nevertheless
there remain two important endogenous explanatory variables that are affected
bydemand policy and for which auxiliary equations must be developed. The
full effect of a restrictive demand policy, for instance, would alter the in—
flation rate not only through the nominal GNP growth andlagged output ratio
variables, but also through. the effect of demand policy on the behavior of
productivity and the exchange rate.18
REFERENCES
R. Barro, and N. Rush, "Unanticipated Money and Economic Activity", in
S. Fischer, ed., RationalExpectations and Economic Policy, Chicago:
1980, 23—48.
A. Blinder, Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation, New York, 1979.
___________andW. Newton, "The 1971—74 Controls Program and the Price
Level: An Econometric Post—Mortem", NBER working paper no. 279, 1978.
G.E.P. Box and G. Taio, "Intervention Analysis with Applications to
Economic and Environmental Problems", Journal of the American
stical Association, 1975, 70:70—79.
E. Feige and D. Pearce, "Inflation and Incomes Policy: An Application of
Time Series Models", in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, eds.,
Carnegie—Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Supplement to
Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 2, New York, 1976.
J. Frye and R.J. Gordon, "The Variance and Acceleration of Inflation in
the 1970s: Alternative Explanatory Models and Methods", working paper,
Northwestern University, 1980.
R.J. Gordon, "The Responses of Wages and Prices to the First Two Years of
Controls", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1973, 4:765—79.
___________"TheImpact of Aggregate Demand on Prices", Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 1975, 6:613—62.
W. Oi, "On Measuring the Impact of Wage—Price Controls: A Critical
Appraisal", in K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, The Economics of Wage and
Price Controls, 1976, Carnegie—Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, Volume 2, Supplementary Series to the Journal of Monetary
Economics.19
J. Perloff and M. Wachter, "A Production Function—Nonaccelerating Inflation
Approach to Potential Output: Is Measured Potential Output Too High?"
in K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, eds., Carnegie—Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, Supplement to Volume 10, New York, 1973.
G. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice", Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, forthcoming.20
FOOTNOTES
1. Figures refer to the quarterly change in the fixed—weight GNP deflator
expressed at annual rates. This is the dependent variable in all of
the equations presented in this paper.
2. See Gordon's 1980 article.
3. A more detailed presentation of this specification is presented by Frye
and Gordon.
4. Equation (2) contains productivity and supply shift terms but otherwise
is identical to equation (6) in Gordon (1980).
5. See especially the paper by Robert Barro and Mark Rush.
6.The use of dummy variables to assess an intervention in an ARIMAprocess
is discussed by G.E.P. Box and G.C. Taio. We find inflation in non—
controls quarters is described by the integrated moving average process
(l—B)p =(l—0B)a, where B is the backshift operator B X =X1,and the
a have independent identical normal distributions. If the imposition
and removal of controls affect inflation, we may write Pt =a+
a] ONt + ct2OFF. This implies the regression equation l:OB Pt =
1®BONt + 2 1—OB OFFt + a, in which each variable is pre—filtered
by subtracting an exponential weighted moving average of its past values.
7.Other choices for the timing of the controls effects are presented in Frye
and Gordon.
8.The dependent variable is a quarterly change expressed at an annual rate
and varies from roughly zero to 12 percent during 1954—80.
9.For more on the methodology of estimating the impact of controls and other
types of government intervention, see Gordon (1973), Alan Blinder, and
Walter Oi.21
10. Any mismeasurement of is a source of a constant term in a re2ression
fit to (2). For example, if Qwereabove the level required for non—
accelerating inflation, the output ratio would be too low to explain
its share of the inflation which actually occurred.
ll The exact method of performing the ttstripping process is described
in Gordon (1975, pp. 656—660). This variable was updated using the
methods described in that source to the end of 1976, and has been extra-
polated using a regression of the 1954—76 variable on current and lagged
values of the deflators of consumer direct expenditures on food and energy.
12. Possible mismeasurement of Qisthe other source.
13. The variable is calculated as the percentage change in (l/(l—T)), where
Tisthe ratio of total Federal and state social security contributions
to total wage and salary income in the national income accounts.
14. The estimated equation differs from (3) in two respects. First, controls
dummies and the effective exchange rate are, of course, omitted. Second,
the equation is made dynamically stable by imposing the constraint y =
Ouriterative procedure to achieve this stopped just short of convergence,
so the coefficient on lagged inflation is estimated at 0.85 and that on
adjusted nominal GNP growth is estimated at 0.16. All other coefficient
estimates are well within a standard error of those reported in (3),
except the constant, which climbs to 0.30.
15. The estimated equation had the effects of controls removed from its
lagged dependent variable,